the history of fifth century Athens, has been an object of interest and controversy since ancient times and has not yet lost its fascination. Thucydides attributed its establishment to fear and insecurity; ' it was Plutarch's contention that it arose from the envy and jealousy natural to a democracy.2 Grote's passionate defense of the institution is one of the more remarkable passages in his great work,3 but it has not won universal acceptance. Walker, for instance, in the Cambridge Ancient History, condemns ostracism as follows:
The case against the Kleisthenic authorship rests on two arguments. The first of these depends on a fragment of Androtion quoted by Harpokration: The crucial words are rore irpcTov, which have usually been taken to mean that the law on ostracism, being aimed at Hipparchos, son of Charmos, was passed immediately before his ostracism in 488/7. Thus Jacoby says, " Aristotle states that the Athenians applied the law enacted by Kleisthenes (i.e. 508/7 B.C.) for the first time in 488/7 B.C.; A. (ndrotion) states that the law was not enacted until that year, and he accentuates the statement-Tov v4,tov T6TE aTpCOTOv TEO&70O." 1 Hignett's interpretation is the same: " By his use of the expression roTTE ITpTov Androtion presumably intended to dismiss briefly the view of a predecessor (possibly Kleidemos) who has attributed the invention of ostracism to Kleisthenes.... Since there is no valid reason for rejecting the evidence of Harpocration it follows that Androtion dated the law on ostracism to the year 488." 11 That this interpretation is by no means the only one possible was recognized by Carcopino, who pointed out that "TOTE peut s'appliquer aussi bien a une periode de vingt ans qu'a une de vingt jours." 12 ToTE means 'then' or 'at that time' relative to the period under discussion; it does not necessarily mean (although it can) 'that year,' ' that month ' or ' that week.' Androtion was writing more than 150 years after the events, and from that perspective roTe could very easily be twenty years. There is, then, no warrant for the assertion that Androtion assigns the introduction of ostracism to the year 488 B.C.
The wording of the passage does suggest, however, that Androtion was criticizing a view of the origin of ostracism with which he did not agree. It is generally assumed that the opinion under criticism was the common one of Kleisthenes' authorship, but there is reason to believe that such was not the case. Aristotle, it is agreed, followed Androtion's A tthis quite closely,"3 yet he simply gives the traditional view that ostracism was introduced by Kleisthenes. There is no indication that he is departing from his chief source. Hignett suggests that " probably he followed Androtion closely on the motive for the introduction of ostracism while rejecting the date." 14 But this is precisely what Aristotle does not do; he rejects nothing but writes a simple narrative, seemingly without noticing any contradiction.'5 The assumption that Androtion was rejecting Kleisthenic authorship by his use of TorTE rpaiiov is not justified. Was there no other tradition about the origin of ostracism? There were, in fact, at least two. One attributed its origin to Hippias " and the other, mentioned by no fewer than three authors, to the time of Theseus.17
Neither tradition is acceptable, yet the one which attributed ostracism to Theseus seems to have been fairly widespread. It behooved a serious historian to put this fairy tale to rest,"8 which is precisely what Androtion did by saying that Hipparchos (not Theseus) was the first man ostracized and that this was accomplished by a law passed TOTE Vp&irov (not back in legendary days). When Aristotle came to deal with the same question there was no need for him to make any comment, for Androtion had already rejected the false tradition. Both Aristotle and Androtion knew that Kleisthenes had been the originator of ostracism and that Hipparchos had been the first man ostracized. They further agreed on the date of that ostracism and on the reason for the establishment of the law. As there is no disagreement between them, the first argument against the Kleisthenic foundation of ostracism has no validity.
The second argument may be summarized as follows: If the law on ostracism was carried by Kleisthenes as part of his constitutional reform of 508/7 and the first man was not ostracized until 488/7, the twenty-year hiatus is inexplicable, for, as Beloch says, "such a weapon was not forged to be left for twenty years in its 13 sheath." 19 Since we are told that the law was aimed at Hipparchos and since he was in fact its first victim-although not until 488/7-the unexplained delay argues against Kleisthenic authorship.20 But this argument fails if the delay can be accounted for, and a proper understanding of the purposes of the institution provides such an explanation.
Ancient sources agree that the law was aimed at the party of the tyrants 21 and in particular at its leader, Hipparchos.22 Hignett saw the weakness of Ari-stotle's attempts to explain the delay in effecting Hipparchos' ostracism and concluded that " the attribution of this motive to Kleisthenes is no more than a conjecture which deduces the purpose of the law from its results." 23 This is itself only a conjecture and should not go unexamined. The sources for the Athenaion Politeica may have been of two kinds, documentary and traditional. If documentary sources existed,24 they would be restricted to a statement of the law, the date it was passed and a reference to its originator; they would not go into the question of purpose except in so far as the wording of the law made that clear. There were, however, separate traditions concerning the origin of ostracism. These would have arisen less from the wording of the law itself than from the arguments of its proponents and detractors. It is natural that such traditions should include an alleged motive for the legislation along with more verifiable information; indeed, it would be surprising if a motive were noot mentioned. It is this tradition-that Kleisthenes had originated the institution and had done so in order to attack the tyrannists and their leader Hipparchos-that Androtion passes on and Aristotle accepts, whatever its source. The only conjecture Aristotle makes is in the attempt to reconcile the purpose of the law, which he takes from the tradition, with the date that purpose was accomplished.
What, then, were the events which caused Kleisthenes to devise this weapon against the Peisistratids ? The overthrow of the tyranny was accomplished by Kleomenes, King of Sparta, at the urging of the exiled Alkmaionids and with the support of some of the aristocrats who had remained in Athens. The common citizens were apathetic,25 for the Peisistratids had come to power as a popular party, and such outrages as they may have committed were directed against the power of the aristocracy rather than against the demos. Shortly after the liberation, a struggle for power developed between Kleisthenes the Alkmaionid and Isagoras, a member of an old aristocratic family. Isagoras was successful in their first encounter, winning the archonship for the year 508/7 and it was then that Kleisthenes first gave any evidence of democratic interests.26 The demos, largely Peisistratid in sympathy,27 had to be won over, and Kleisthenes began by restoring to citizenship those who had been disenfranchised by Isagoras, and by leading the opposition to Isagoras' attempt to establish an oligarchy in Athens.28 But he was far from becoming an instrument of the demos; his reforms were rather Solonian in spirit 2-Solon's requirements for holding office and his class structure were left unchanged-and they brought about no radical change in Athenian political and social institutions. The constitution of Kleisthenes was a victory for the hoplite class over the nobles, and " the landed gentry of Athens were left by Kleisthenes in control of the executive and of the important judicial functions vested in the Areopagus." 3 The expulsion of the Spartans and the oligarchs left Kleisthenes in command of the situation at Athens for the time but in great peril from abroad. The Spartans were sure to attempt a revanche to restore the oligarchs. Unity at home was essential to face the external threat, but as leader of the moderate party Kleisthenes could expect opposition from both sides. The right, it is true, was in disfavor and its leaders in exile; for the time being at least it was politically ineffective. The great political threat was from the left, from the lower classes who had supported the tyranny and who might be expected to support the tyrannists once the threat of oligarchy passed. It is a common characteristic of revolutions (notably the French and Russian) that even when their original aim is only moderate reform, they tend to become more radical as the excited lower classes press for greater changes. The threat of a renascent tyrannist party was Kleisthenes' first problem, compounded by the consideration that destruction of that party was no solution, for he needed the cooperation of the demos and its leaders to face the imminent threat of attack by Sparta and the oligarchs. External danger was the common ground on which all the opponents of oligarchy might meet, whatever their differences on internal questions. So long as Kleisthenes enjoyed the popularity which came from his opposition to Isagoras he could count on 25 the effective support of the demos, but he was still not in a position to resist a determined effort on the part of the tyrannists to deprive him of that support.3" But while Kleisthenes could not afford to destroy the tyrannist party, he could, given the means, deprive it of its leader, and ostracism would provide precisely those means. The law doubtless had the stated intent of preventing the recurrence of tyranny, and being enacted when it was, it was sure to be popular. The decree would have been innocently free of names, since Kleisthenes could not afford the appearance of proposing arbitrary ad hominem legislation, but it must have been immediately apparent that a law against tyranny-one which provided for the exile of a single individual-was in fact most readily applicable against the leader of the tyrannist party, Hipparchos.32 Kleisthenes would not trouble to refute this interpretation, for it suited his purpose admirably. Ostracism had the great virtue of serving as a threat to Hipparchos which need not be carried out if he were willing to cooperate with Kleisthenes. The fact that Kleisthenes was successful in having the law passed indicates that he controlled a majority of the votes, and this enabled him to present Hipparchos with the alternatives of cooperation or ostracism.
It is clear that Hipparchos chose to cooperate, for the next two decades give evidence of a coalition between the party of Kleisthenes and that of Hipparchos. In foreign policy both opposed Sparta and sought alliance with Persia. When Hippias took refuge at the Persian court it gave the tyrannists a tie with Persia, and Kleisthenes too, when menaced by a Spartan invasion, sought protection from Artaphernes, the Persian satrap of Lydia.83 Again, at Marathon in 490 B.C. the tradition of Alkmaionid complicity in the flashing of a shield to signal the Persians, whatever its basis, gives evidence that in the popular mind the family of Kleisthenes was friendly to the tyrants. On the domestic scene the evidence is still more conclusive, for Hipparchos' archonship in 496 34 must have been his reward for support and cooperation.
Hence Kleisthenes' failure to use the law against the man who was undoubtedly its intended victim is seen to have been no failure at all. It had served its purpose so well in fact that the 'sword' could remain in its 'sheath' unused, and this is surely what Kleisthenes intended, for had he wanted merely to be rid of Hipparchos there was no lack of devices already available.85 With the threat of ostracism Kleisthenes was able to check the political ambitions of Hipparchos and his party and to form an effective coalition based on their mutual opposition to oligarchy.
After origin and early history of ostracism. Moreover, their account, most fully and clearly stated in the Athenaion Politeia, is substantially correct, holding that the law was introduced by Kleisthenes along with the rest of his constitutional reforms in 508/7 or shortly thereafter, that it was aimed primarily at the tyrannist party and its leader Hipparchos, and that the first ostracism was not accomplished until 488/7 B.C. when Hipparchos was exiled. Did Kleisthenes intend nothing more in introducing ostracism? He had, to be sure, an immediate political purpose, but it is easy to believe that he intended it to be more than an ad homninem political weapon. His imaginative and far-sighted reorganization of the tribal system lends weight to this supposition as does the carefully designed and complicated machinery of the process of ostracism itself. So soon after the overthrow of tyranny, while the threat of its restoration was still a real one, the originator of ostracism surely meant to create a device to check the rise of future tyrants. But the great constitutional question facing the newly born democracy, one which faces every democracy, was how to prevent the dangers of faction and subversion while avoiding the extremes of inquisition, violence and mass expulsion resorted to by other Greek democracies with tragic consequences.40 The difficulties confronting a democracy are aptly described by Grote:
The force in the hands of any government, to cope with conspirators or mutineers, was extremely small, with the single exception of a despot surrounded with his mercenary troops. Accordingly, no tolerably sustained conspiracy or usurper could be put down except by direct aid of the people in support of the government; which amounted to a dissolution, for the time, of constitutional authority, and was pregnant with reactionary consequences such as no man could foresee. To prevent powerful men from attempting usurpation was therefore of the greatest possible moment. Now a despot or an oligarchy might exercise at its pleasure preventive means, much sharper than the ostracism, such as the assassination of Kimon . directed by the Peisistratids. At the very least, they might send away any one, from whom they apprehended attack or danger, without incurring even so much as the imputation of severity. But in a democracy, where arbitrary action of the magistrate was the thing of all others most dreaded, and when fixed laws, with trial and defence as preliminaries to punishment, were conceived by the ordinary citizen as the guarantees of his personal security and as the pride of his social condition-the creation of such an exceptional power presented difficulties.4'
